



**U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Inspector General**

12-P-0847
September 21, 2012

At a Glance

Why We Did This Review

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to assess the security posture and in-place environmental controls of EPA's Radiation and Indoor Environments National Laboratory computer room in Las Vegas, Nevada. This audit was conducted in support of the audit of EPA's directory service system authentication and authorization servers.

This report addresses the following EPA Goal or Cross-Cutting Strategy:

- Strengthening EPA's workforce and capabilities.

For further information, contact our Office of Congressional and Public Affairs at (202) 566-2391.

The full report is at:
www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2012/20120921-12-P-0847.pdf

EPA's Radiation and Indoor Environments National Laboratory Should Improve Its Computer Room Security Controls

What We Found

Our review of the security posture and in-place environmental controls of EPA's Radiation and Indoor Environments National Laboratory computer room disclosed an array of security and environmental control deficiencies. These deficiencies greatly hinder the ability of the Office of Air and Radiation (OAR) to safeguard critical information technology assets and associated data from the risk of damage and/or loss.

Recommendations and Planned Agency Corrective Actions

We recommended in our draft report that OAR remediate physical and environmental control deficiencies. In its response to the draft report, OAR provided a corrective action plan with milestone dates to address agreed-upon recommendations 1 through 5. OAR did not agree or disagree with recommendation 6 because corrective actions required consultation with the U.S. General Services Administration to identify a suitable resolution.

OAR subsequently submitted an updated status on agreed-upon corrective actions. Based upon that status, corrective actions for recommendations 1 through 5 have been completed. In the updated status, OAR proposed an alternative action of accepting the risks of not installing the emergency shut-off valve for recommendation 6. OAR made this proposal because its initial investigation suggested that compliance would be cost prohibitive and the local fire code may make necessary modifications infeasible. OAR agreed to assume the risks associated with that decision.

We consider recommendations 1 through 5 closed with agreed-upon corrective actions complete. For recommendation 6, we accept OAR's proposal and have updated it to reflect necessary steps OAR must undertake to implement the proposed alternative action. Specifically, OAR management should update its information security plan to formally accept the risks for not meeting minimum information systems security controls required by federal guidance. OAR concurred with the update to recommendation 6. Although OAR has concurred with the recommendation change, we consider recommendation 6 unresolved pending receipt of a corrective action plan with milestone completion dates.