## **BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATOR UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY**

In the Matter of King Finishing )	
Title V Operating Permit )	
No. 2261-251-0008-V-01-0 )	
)	
)	
)	
Issued by the Georgia Environmental )	
Protection Division )	

Petition No: 04-01-\_\_\_\_\_

# PETITION TO HAVE THE ADMINISTRATOR OBJECT TO KING FINISHING'S TITLE V PERMIT

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#### I. INTRODUCTION

A recent scientific study claims that air pollution from just one industrial segment shortens the lives of over 1,600 people in Georgia each year.<sup>1</sup> 2,581,516 Georgians live in areas that the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) has designated as failing to meet the health based ambient air quality standard for ground level ozone.<sup>2</sup> Ozone is a powerful lung irritant that can cause shortness of breath, coughing, burning eyes, chest pain, asthma attacks and other respiratory problems and a lessened ability to fight off disease and infection.<sup>3</sup> There are also significant economic consequences of air pollution. Georgia's air pollution problems have reached such levels as to catch the attention of the media including major local newspapers. *See e.g.* May 1, 2001 Atlanta Journal, "Bad air days: Atlanta ranks sixth in pollution."

Interposed between Georgians and the air pollution is the Clean Air Act. In simple terms, the Clean Air Act has the US EPA set standards for safe ambient air and then requires air pollution control agencies to issue permits to major stationary sources of air pollution as well as implement regulations to control pollution from mobile sources. The permits for major stationary sources are designed to ensure that aggregate air pollution does not exceed ambient air quality standards.

A major component of the Clean Air Act is the Title V permitting program. According to the US EPA:

http://www.cleartheair.org/fact/SmogWatch2000.pdf?PROACTIVE\_ID=cecfcfcfcacacac8c6c5cecfcfcfc5cecfca

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Death, Disease and Dirty Power, Clean Air Task Force, October 2000, at 22 available at http://www.cleartheair.org/fact/mortality/mortalitystudy.vtml?PROACTIVE\_ID=cecfcfcecfccc6cdccc5cecfcfcf c5cecfc9cbcccac6c6c7c9c5cf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Smog Watch 2000, Clean Air Network, June, 2000 at 11 available at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> *Id*. at 16.

The purpose of title V permits is to reduce violations of air pollution laws and improve enforcement of those laws. Title V permits do this by:

- 1. recording in one document all of the air pollution control requirements that apply to the source. This gives members of the public, regulators, and the source a clear picture of what the facility is required to do to keep its air pollution under the legal limits.
- 2. requiring the source to make regular reports on how it is tracking its emissions of pollution and the controls it is using to limit its emissions. These reports are public information, and you can get them from the permitting authority.
- 3. adding monitoring, testing, or record keeping requirements, where needed to assure that the source complies with its emission limits or other pollution control requirements.
- 4. requiring the source to certify each year whether or not it has met the air pollution requirements in its title V permit. These certifications are public information.
- 5. making the terms of the title V permit federally enforceable. This means that EPA and the public can enforce the terms of the permit, along with the State.

See http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/permits/index.html. However, the Georgia Environmental

Protection Division (EPD) has derailed this purpose by issuing a Title V permit with

numerous flaws that are discussed in more detail below.

#### II. PARTIES

The Sierra Club, a non-profit corporation, is one of the nation's oldest and largest environmental organizations. The Sierra Club has been involved in air pollution issues in Georgia and throughout the nation. The Georgia Chapter of the Sierra Club has over 14,000 members. Sierra Club members live, work, farm, recreate, grow food, own land and structures, and obtain spiritual and aesthetic pleasure from locations that are adversely affected by the air pollution from this facility. In addition, the Sierra Club requires the monitoring information mandated by final Title V permits in order to conduct its work to clean up the air in Georgia. However, if the permit does not contain complete monitoring and reporting, the Sierra Club will not be able to obtain all of the information that it needs to do its work.

## III. PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS

The US EPA granted final approval of the Georgia Title V operating permit program on June 8, 2000. 65 FR 36398 (June 8, 2000). The Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources is the agency responsible for issuing Title V operating permits in Georgia. O.C.G.A. §§12-9-3(12), 12-9-4, 12-9-6(b)(3).

EPD issued a draft Title V operating permit for King Finishing ("King Finishing" or "Facility") on March 30, 2001. *See* Ex. 1 at 1. EPD granted the public a thirty-day period to comment on this draft permit. The public notice announcing the public comment period was published in <u>The Sylvania Telephone Newspaper</u> on April 26, 2001. *See* Ex. 1 at 1. Thus, the public comment period ended on May 29, 2001 as May 28, 2001 was a holiday. *See* Ex. 1 at 1. EPD misinformed the public, via its web page, that the public comment period ended on May 26, 2001. *See* Ex. 2 at 1. On May 28, 2001, the Sierra Club submitted comments to EPD on the King Finishing. *See* Ex. 3. *See also* Ex. 1 at 1.<sup>4</sup> King Finishing submitted comments on May 31, 2001, after the comment period expired. *See* Ex. 1 at 1. Nevertheless, EPD responded to both sets of comments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Ex. 1 states that EPD received comments for the Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest. This is not accurate. The Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest is counsel for the Sierra Club. Thus, the Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest submitted comments on behalf of the Sierra Club. EPD is well aware that the Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest is counsel for Sierra Club but for some unknown reason continues to try to create a false impression that the Georgia Center for Law in the Public Interest submitts comments rather than Sierra Club.

On May 29, 2001, Jimmy Johnston, who is the head of EPD's Air Protection Branch Stationary Source Permitting Program, and thus is responsible as a practical matter for issuing Title V permits, informed Sierra Club, through its counsel, that EPD intended to repropose to EPA the King Finishing Title V permit. *See* Ex. 4. On June 19, 2001, EPD repeated that it intended to re-propose the King Finishing Title V permit in the future. *See* Ex. 5. On June 26, 2001, EPD re-proposed the King Finishing Title V permit to US EPA. *See* Ex. 6. Art Hofmeister, the US EPA Region 4 person responsible for reviewing Georgia issued Title V permits, confirmed that EPD re-proposed the King Finishing permit on June 26, 2001. *See* Ex. 7. According to US EPA and EPD, the public's petition requesting that US EPA object to a Title V permit is due 105 days after EPD re-proposes a permit to US EPA. *See* Ex. 8. *see also In re: Orange Recycling & Ethanol Production Facility*, II-2000-07 (EPA Administrator May 2, 2001) at 3. Thus, this petition is due no earlier than October 9, 2001. Therefore, this petition is timely.

EPD issued the final permit on July 9, 2001. *See* Ex. 9. We note that this was before US EPA's 45 day comment period had expired. Thus, EPD violated 40 CFR § 70.7(a)(1)(v) by issuing this permit before the Administrator's review period had expired.

IV. FACTS

The operation of the Facility, which is the subject of this Petition, is described as follows:

This plant is involved in the bleaching, dyeing, finishing and printing of cotton and manmade fabrics. There are four primary areas: preparation, dyeing, finishing, and printing. Based on the specific product required portions of each sub process can/will be used in numerous combinations to

meet a customer specification. The purpose of preparation is to increase dimensional stability, to remove chemicals used in the weaving or fiber preparation, to improve dye affinity/uptake, and to improve strength of the fabric. There can be several steps involved including singeing, desizing, heat setting, mercerization, bleaching, and washing. The dyeing department is a continuous process and typically consists of dye application, dye fixation with chemicals or heat, washing, and drying. Finishing refers to any operations (other than preparation and coloring) that improve the appearance and/or usefulness of fabric after it has been woven or knitted. Finishing encompasses any of several mechanical and chemical processes performed on fiber, yarn, or fabric to improve its appearance, texture, or performance. The fabric then passes through the finish pad where the chemicals are applied, a pre-dryer and then another set of dry cans before entering the tenter house. The tenter house uses tension to stretch the fabric to the desired width. The finish desired and the placement in the overall process is dependent on the conditions given by the customer.

Ex. 9 at 1.

This Facility is located between Augusta and Savannah and has the potential to emit more than 250 tons per year (tpy) of Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Sulfur Dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>) and Particulate Matter (PM). This is a major concern because both the Augusta region and the Savannah region have ambient air concentration above the safe levels for PM and for ozone. Ground level ozone is formed by a chemical reaction involving NOx. PM is harmful in its own right.

## V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1. EPD's public participation process for this permit was inadequate because EPD did not notify people, via a mailing list, of the public comment period, did not explain to the public in the public notice where they can obtain all of the relevant documents, and provided incorrect information in the public notice. 2. The language in Facility's permit appears to limit what credible evidence can be used to prove a violation. Such a limitation is contrary to the US EPA's "any credible evidence" rule and therefore must be removed and replaced with language that makes clear that any credible evidence can be used.

3. The permit impermissibly limits who make take actions to enforce it to "citizens of the United States" in contrast to the Clean Air Act, which provides that any person may take an enforcement action.

4. The permit does not require the permittee to report all of the results of monitoring to the state agency.

5. The permit allows the permittee to rely on predictions of the NOx emissions without any requirements as to how the permittee makes those predictions.

#### VI. ARGUMENT

#### A. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Clean Air Act is "Congress's response to well-documented scientific and social concerns about the quality of the air that sustains life on earth and protects it from .... degradation and pollution caused by modern industrial society." *Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis*, 932 F.2d 256, 260 (3rd Cir. 1991). A key component to achieve the Clean Air Act's goal of protecting our precious air is the Title V operating permit program. Title V permits are supposed to consolidate all of the requirements for a facility into a single permit and provide for adequate monitoring and reporting to ensure the regulatory agencies and the public that the permittee is complying with its permit. *See generally* S. Rep. No. 101-228 at 346-47; *see also In re: Roosevelt Regional Landfill*, (EPA Administrator May 11, 1999) at 64 FR 25336.

When a state or local air quality permitting authority issues a Title V operating permit, the US EPA will object if the permit is not in compliance with any applicable requirement or requirements under 40 CFR Part 70. 40 CFR § 70.8(c). However, if the US EPA does not object, then "any person may petition the Administrator within 60 days after the expiration of the Administrator's 45-day review period to make such objection." 40 CFR § 70.8(d); 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2)(CAAA § 505(b)(2)). "To justify exercise of an objection by US EPA to a [T]itle V permit pursuant to Section 505(b)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate that the permit is not in compliance with applicable requirements of the Act, including the requirements of Part 70. [40 CFR] § 70.8(d)." *In re: Pacificorp's Jim Bridger and Naughton Plants*, VIII-00-1 (EPA Administrator Nov. 16, 2000) at 4.

## B. THE FACILITY'S PERMIT IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT.

## 1. EPD'S PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROCEDURES DID NOT COMPORT WITH PART 70 REQUIREMENTS.<sup>5</sup>

"Public participation is an important part of the title V process, and is an appropriate subject of an objection by EPA pursuant to 40 CFR § 70.8(c)(3)(iii)." *In Re: Orange Recycling & Ethanol Production Facility*, II-2000-07 (EPA Admin. May 2, 2001) at 4. In this case, EPD did not undertake the required public participation activities for this permit. Therefore, the Part 70 regulations make it illegal for EPD to issue the final permit. 40 CFR § 70.7(a)(1)(ii). Rather, based on the reasons below, US EPA should object to this permit and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This issue was raised in Petitioner's Comment 1 at pages 2-4, attached as Ex. 3. Therefore, Petitioner has satisfied the requirement of 40 CFR § 70.8(d) that the petition points were raised with reasonable specificity during the public comment period.

require EPD to re-notice the draft permit for a new public comment period that follows, at a minimum, the public participation processes specified in the law.

## a. EPD DID NOT PROVIDE NOTICE OF THIS PERMIT VIA A MAILING TO PEOPLE ON ITS MAILING LIST.

40 CFR § 70.7(h)(1) requires that EPD give notice of the draft permit by mailing such notice to a mailing list that includes people who have requested to be on that mailing list. EPD did not mail notice of this draft permit to people on the mailing list. EPD does not dispute this point. <u>See</u> Ex. 1 at Response to Comment 1. Therefore, because EPD did not comply with the requirements for public participation under paragraph (h), EPA should object to the permit and require EPD to re-notice this permit for a new 30-day comment period. 40 CFR § 70.7(a)(1)(ii).

## b. THE PUBLIC NOTICE DOES NOT INFORM THE PUBLIC WHERE THEY CAN OBTAIN ALL RELEVANT SUPPORTING MATERIALS AND ALL OTHER MATERIALS AVAILABLE TO THE PERMITTING AUTHORITY.

40 CFR § 70.7(h)(2) states that the public notice will explain where the public can review all relevant supporting documents and all documents available to the permitting authority.

As the Administrator stated in the Borden Chemical Inc. petition response, petition VI-01-01, available at http://www.epa.gov/region07/programs/artd/air/title5/petitiondb/petitions (under Borden\_response1999), "access to information is a necessary prerequisite to meaningful public participation." Public involvement is required throughout the CAA title V permit process (see, e.g., CAA section 502(b), 503)(e) and 505(b)), EPA's implementing regulations (see 40 CFR §§ 70.7 and 70.8) and New York regulations (6 NYCRR 621).

#### In re: Orange Recycling & Ethanol Production Facility at 5.

EPD's public notice states that "all information used to develop the draft permit are available for review." Ex. 11 at 1. Although EPD's use of the passive voice creates confusion, it appears that what EPD is saying is that all information that it used to develop the draft permit is available for review at its office. While this may be true, Part 70 requires EPD to make available "all relevant supporting materials, including those set forth in § 70.4(b)(3)(viii) of this part, and all other materials available to the permitting authority that are relevant to the permit decision[.]" 40 CFR § 70.7(h)(2). Thus, the standard as set forth in the regulations is that EPD notify the public of where they can obtain all of the materials that EPD could have used, as opposed to materials that EPD did use. EPD mis-interpretation of this requirement is unfortunately symptomatic of EPD attitude towards public participation. EPD generally views public participation as something they are forced to do by law rather than as an opportunity to better protect the environment. With such an attitude, it is not surprising that EPD does not believe the public should view any documents that it did not use. After all, in EPD's way of thinking, what could be gained by the public reviewing addition documents? Fortunately, the drafters of the Part 70 regulations did not suffer from EPD's lack of understanding of the value of public participation.

Much of the information the public needs to review to determine whether a compliance schedule is required or whether conditions are adequate are actually maintained at the permittee's facility rather than at EPD's office. For example, much of the monitoring information required under the pre-construction permit is maintained at the facility. EPD must notify the public of this fact so they can review this information. In addition, the Risk Management Plan, to the extent that it exists, would be at the RMP Reporting Center in

Virginia. *See* Ex. 1 at second to last page. The public should be able to review this critical document.

## c. THE PUBLIC NOTICE INCORRECTLY STATES THAT THE PERMIT IS ONLY ENFORCEABLE BY THE EPA AND EPD.

The public notice also contains inaccurate information. For example, the notice states "[t]his permit will be enforceable by the Georgia EPD and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency." *See* Ex. 11. This statement is incomplete. The permit will also be enforceable by any "person." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). The Clean Air Act defines "person" to include an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, and a political subdivision of a state. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e).

While this oversight may appear insignificant, correcting this misstatement is important for at least two reasons. To begin with, it is inherently important for the government to always provide the public with accurate information. In addition, EPD has recognized that public involvement in the Operating Permit program has been limited. The onus is on the state agency to involve people in this regulatory process. 40 CFR. § 70.7(h). It is only with full and meaningful public participation that we can hope to have clean air here in Georgia. *See generally* Ashley Schannauer, Science and Policy in Risk Assessment: The Need for Effective Public Participation, 24 Vermont Law Review 31 (1999). In order to involve the public in the Operating Permit program, an important first step is to convince the public that this program is a legitimate means by which the public can participate to achieve the goal of attaining clean air. If the public is aware of their right to enforce a permit, they

are more likely to put effort into ensuring that the permit is adequately protective of the environment.

Furthermore, the public notice states that "[a]fter the comment period has expired, the EPD will consider all comments, make any necessary changes and issue the Title V operating permit." This statement is inaccurate. Specifically, the statement suggests that, while EPD may make changes, in the end, EPD *will* issue the permit. However, under certain circumstances, EPD is required to refuse to issue a Title V permit. *See* 40 CFR § 70.7(a). As such, the aforementioned statement could be interpreted as an indication of EPD's predisposition to issue Title V permits regardless of whether the permit complies with the law. *See American Wildlands v. Forest Service*, CV 97-160-M-DWM (D.Mont. Apr. 16, 1999)(Denying government deference because of evidence of predisposition towards a predetermined outcome). Therefore, EPA should object to this permit because the public notice contains inaccurate and misleading information.

## 2. THE PERMIT APPEARS TO LIMIT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE FROM BEING USED IN AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION.<sup>6</sup>

As emphasized by the US EPA's Credible Evidence Rule, 62 FR 8314 (Feb. 24, 1997), the Clean Air Act (CAA) allows the public, EPD, US EPA, and the regulated facility to rely upon any credible evidence to demonstrate violations of or compliance with the terms and conditions of a Title V operating permit. Specifically, US EPA revised 40 CFR § 51.212, 51.12. 52.30, 60.11 and 61.12 to "make clear that enforcement authorities can prosecute actions based exclusively on any credible evidence, without the need to rely on any

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This issue was raised in Petitioner's Comment 4 at pages 5-6, attached as Ex. 3. Therefore, Petitioner has satisfied the requirement of 40 CFR § 70.8(d) that the petition points were raised with reasonable specificity during the public comment period.

data from a particular reference test." 62 FR at 8316. EPD has failed to ensure that no permit condition purports to limit the use of credible evidence. Moreover, EPD failed to include standard language in the permit stating that all credible evidence may be used.

## a. EPD MUST REMOVE LANGUAGE THAT PURPORTS TO LIMIT THE USE OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.

US EPA has made it very clear that Title V permits must contain no language that could be interpreted to limit credible evidence. However, this permit does contain language that could easily be understood as limiting credible evidence. For example, condition 4.1.3. in the permit states that "[t]he methods for the determination of compliance with emissions limits listed under Sections 3.2,3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 which pertain to the emission units listed in Section 3.1 are as follows:" Ex. 9 at 8. One could read this provision to stand for the proposition that when a government agency or member of the public takes an enforcement action for a permittee violating its permit, the enforcer can only rely on information from the methods of determination listed in the permit. This position is directly contrary to the Clean Air Act requirements in CAA §§ 113(a), 113(e)(1) and 40 CFR § 51.212, 51.12. 52.30, 60.11 and 61.12 which allow anyone taking an enforcement action to rely on any credible evidence. Therefore, the aforementioned sentence in Section 4.1.3 should be stricken.

Another example of the permit's attempt to limit credible evidence is found in the second sentence of condition 18.17.1. Ex. 9 at 30. This condition claims to limit the usable evidence to information that is available to EPD. Of course, the public or US EPA may obtain information about a facility from sources other than EPD, such as information from a whistleblower or from people that live near the facility. As such, it is inappropriate to limit credible evidence to exclude such information. Therefore, the aforementioned provision

must be removed from the permit. Of course, the preferred option is to simply remove the sentence. A less desirable option is to re-write it to state that "EPD may determine . . .."

Similarly, Condition 6.1.3 of the permit, which states that "failures shall be determined through observation, data from any monitoring protocol, or by any other monitoring which is required by the permit," could be considered to limit the use of credible evidence. To correct the problem, this Condition should include an additional clause requiring reporting of any failure based on any credible evidence, including observation, data from monitoring protocols and other monitoring required by the permit.

EPD claims that Rule 391-3-1.02(3)(a) and the Procedures for Testing and Monitoring Sources of Air Pollutants ("Procedures Manual") at Section 1.3(g) remove any limitation on the use of any credible evidence in enforcement actions. *See* Ex. 1 at Response to Comment 4. Even if these two items stood for the proposition for which EPD offers them, EPD ignores the permit shield provision in the permit. EPD also fails to explain why burying such a critical issue by incorporation by reference to a testing manual or Georgia state rules make this permit practicably enforceable. As the Administrator has recently stated,

One purpose of the title V program is to enable the source, EPA, States, and the public to **clearly** understand the regulatory requirements applicable to the source and whether the source is meeting those requirements. Thus, the title V operating permits program is a vehicle for assuring that existing air quality control requirements are appropriately applied to facility emission units in a **single** document and assuring compliance with these requirements.

*In re: Orange Recycling*, at 3 (emphasis added). Not only is EPD's approach contrary to this purpose, it is difficult to see any rational basis for this approach and

EPD has certainly not offered one. See also Id. at 36 (rejecting incorporation by

reference).

As mentioned above, EPD relies upon two items to support its position. The first, Rule

391-3-1-.02(3)(a), works to apparently limit credible evidence rather than remove such a

limitation. It states:

Any sampling, computation and analysis to determine the compliance with any of the emissions limitations or standards set forth herein shall be in accordance with the applicable procedures and methods specified in the Georgia Department of Natural Resources **Procedures for Testing and Monitoring Sources of Air Pollution** 

Rule 391-3-1-.02(3)(a)(emphasis in the original). A straightforward reading of this provision supports an interpretation that would exclude any evidence to determine compliance except evidence obtained through methods set forth in the Procedures Manual. The fact that, with the exception of the undersigned, the only people in possession of this Procedures Manual are regulated entities, their contractors and a few other government agencies, does nothing to strengthen EPD's position.

Turning to Section 1.3(g), it states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of any applicable rule or regulation or requirement of this text, for the purpose of submission of compliance certifications or establishing whether or not a person has violated or is in violation of any emissions limitation or standard, nothing in these Procedures for Testing and Monitoring Sources of Air Pollutants or any Emission Limitation or Standard to which it pertains, shall preclude the use, including the exclusive use, of any credible evidence or information, relevant to whether a source would have been in compliance with applicable requirements if the appropriate performance or compliance test or procedure had been performed.

Again, even if we assume that this Section supported EPD's position, we

would nevertheless have to overcome the seemingly insurmountable due process

obstacle that a Procedures Manual cannot overcome the language of a permit with a

permit shield provision and a rule that has been promulgated following notice and comment. If we were able to overcome this obstacle, it is nevertheless extremely unclear that Section 1.3(g) helps to remove limitations on the use of credible evidence. The Section states that "nothing in these Procedures . . . or any Emissions Limitation or Standard." Thus, this Section applies to the Procedures Manual and Emissions Limitations and Standards. This Section does not appear to apply to Title V permits. Worse yet, the Section does not state that one can use any credible evidence. It only states that one can use any credible evidence to show whether a source would have been in compliance "if the appropriate performance or compliance test or procedure had been performed." Section 1.3(g). Whether the credible evidence one wants to use is the "**appropriate** performance or compliance test or procedure" is anyone's guess. However, Title V was not created to encourage guessing. Therefore, rather than this morass, US EPA should require EPD to remove the language that appears to limit credible evidence.

## b. EPD SHOULD INCLUDE STANDARD LANGUAGE IN ITS PERMITS THAT EXPLICITLY STATES THAT ANYONE CAN USE ANY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.

US EPA should further require EPD to affirmatively state in the permit that any credible evidence may be used in an enforcement action. US EPA supports the inclusion of credible evidence language in all Title V permits. As explained by the Acting Chief of US EPA's Air Programs branch:

It is the United States Environmental Protection Agency's position that the general language addressing the use of credible evidence is necessary to make it clear that despite any other language contained in the permit, credible

evidence can be used to show compliance or noncompliance with applicable requirements. . . . [A] regulated entity could construe the language to mean that the methods for demonstrating compliance specified in the permit are the only methods admissible to demonstrate violation of the permit terms. It is important that Title V permits not lend themselves to this improper construction.

Letter from Cheryl L. Newton, Acting Chief, Air Programs Branch, EPA, to Robert F. Hodanbosi, Chief, Division of Air Pollution Control, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, dated October 30, 1998. In fact, US EPA apparently sent a letter in May 1998 specifically directing EPD to amend its SIP to include language clarifying that any credible evidence may be used. *See* Ex. 10. Nevertheless, while three years have elapsed since US EPA's request, the permit does not contain the necessary language.

While anyone may rely on *all* credible evidence regardless of whether this condition appears in the permit, EPD should include credible evidence language in the permits and permit template to make the point clear. Specifically, US EPA has recommended that the following language be included in all Title V permits:

Notwithstanding the conditions of this permit that state specific methods that may be used to assess compliance or noncompliance with applicable requirements, other credible evidence may be used to demonstrate compliance or noncompliance.

Letter from Stephen Rothblatt, Acting Director, Air and Radiation Division, US EPA, to Paul Deubenetzky, Indiana Department of Environmental Management, dated July 28, 1998. We request that US EPA object to this permit and modify the permit to include this provision to clarify the availability of any credible evidence to demonstrate noncompliance with permit requirements.

#### 3. THE PERMIT IMPERMISSIBLY LIMITS ENFORCEMENT TO

## "CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES."7

"The Title V operating permits program is a vehicle for ensuring that existing air quality control requirements are appropriately applied to facility emission units in a single document and that compliance with these requirements is assured." *In re: Roosevelt Regional Landfill*, (EPA Administrator May 11, 1999) at 64 FR 25336. There are three types of entities that are permitted to take action to assure compliance with a Title V permit: the EPA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7413; the State pursuant to state law or 42 U.S.C. § 7604; and any "person" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7604. Of course, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 is labeled "citizen suits." However, "citizen" in this context includes all members of the public.

"Citizen suits," as they have come to be know, are a particularly important method of assuring compliance with Title V permits. As the Supreme Court has noted:

Yet the pressures on agencies for favorable action one way or the other are enormous. The suggestion that Congress can stop action which is undesirable is true in theory; yet even Congress is too remote to give meaningful direction and its machinery is too ponderous to use very often. The federal agencies of which I speak are not venal or corrupt. But they are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manipulate them through advisory committees, or friendly working relations, or who have that natural affinity with the agency, which in time develops, between the regulator and the regulated. As early as 1894, Attorney General Olney predicted that regulatory agencies might become 'industry-minded,' as illustrated by his forecast concerning the Interstate Commerce Commission:

'The Commission . . . is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of railroads, at the same time that that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things.' M. Josephson, The Politicos 526 (1938).

Years later a court of appeals observed, 'the recurring question which has plagued public regulation of industry (is) whether the regulatory agency is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> This issue was raised in Petitioner's Comment 2 at pages 4, attached as Ex. 3. Therefore, Petitioner has satisfied the requirement of 40 CFR § 70.8(d) that the petition points were raised with reasonable specificity during the public comment period.

unduly oriented toward the interests of the industry it is designed to regulate, rather than the public interest it is designed to protect.' Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 893.

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-47 (1972). See also Molokai Chamber of

Commerce v. Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389, 1402 (D. Haw. 1995) (Congress

intended that citizen suits would serve as "an integral part of [the Clean Water Act's] overall

enforcement scheme"); Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1525 (9th Cir.

1987) ("citizens should be unconstrained to bring [Clean Water Act] actions") (quoting S.

Rep. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668, 3746);

see also id. ("Congress intended Clean Water Act citizen suits to be "handled liberally,

because they perform an important public function"); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 182 F.3d

1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting Congress' intent to promote citizen enforcement of ESA);

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546, 560, 106 S.Ct. 3088

(1986) (Congress enacted Clean Air Act's attorney's fees provision "to promote citizen

enforcement of important federal policies.").

EPD's Title V permit seriously undermines the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air

Act. Condition 8.2.1 of the permit states:

Except as identified as "State-only enforceable" requirements in this Permit, all terms and conditions contained herein shall be enforceable by the EPA and citizens of the United States under the Clean Air Act[.]

Ex. 9 at Condition 8.2.1 (Emphasis added). However, the relevant section of Part 70 provides that "all terms and conditions in a part 70 permit, are enforceable by the Administrator and citizens under the Act." 40 CFR § 70.6(b)(1). This section clearly does not limit who may bring enforcement actions to citizens "of the United States." Furthermore, the Clean Air Act ends any debate on this issue. It provides that "any person" may bring a

citizen suit. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). The Act goes on to define person as including "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, political subdivision of a state . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e). Thus, the impact of this oversight is significant. Specifically, "citizens of the United States" represents a small subset of those who fall under the statutory definition of "person." As written, the EPD permit excludes corporations, both for and non-profit, counties, not to mention resident aliens and others whose immigration status is other than citizens of the United States.<sup>8</sup>

Nevertheless, EPD has argued that the use of the term "citizens of the United States," does not affect the fact that any person, as authorized by the Act, can enforce the permit. EPD cites no authority for its argument. In addition, EPD ignores the permit shield in condition 8.16.1. Even assuming that EPD's position is correct, a plaintiff may be forced to litigate the issue. Even if a court would ultimately rule that any person, and not only a citizen of the United States, can enforce this permit, what could possibly be the value of forcing parties to expend valuable resources litigating an issue that could have been expeditiously addressed in the context of the permit? Surely draining public and private resources through protracted litigation does nothing to assure compliance with the provisions of a Title V permit. Moreover, given the misleading language contained in the permit, an individual untrained in the law may actually conclude that he or she cannot enforce the permit based on the plain language of the permit. Again, there is no value in allowing room for this confusion. Rather, the purpose of Title V permits assuring compliance is served by modifying the language.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The fact that Georgia's Title V permits claim to limit the rights of non-citizens of the United States raises serious environmental justice and equal protection issues.

Of course, the remedy is so simple that it is difficult to conceive any legitimate reasons for EPD to refuse Petitioner's request to modify the language. EPD simply needs to delete the phrase "of the United States," out of condition 8.2.1.

Furthermore, the permit is misleading by including mention of the public's right to sue under a section entitled "EPA Authority." We recommend that EPD create a separate section, which discusses the public's right to sue under a heading such as "Public's Enforcement Authority."

## 4. THE FACILITY'S PERMIT DOES NOT REQUIRE IT TO REPORT THE RESULTS OF ALL ITS MONITORING<sup>9</sup>

42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) requires that all Title V permits require "the permittee submit to the permitting authority, no less often than every 6 months, the results of any required monitoring[.]" *Id.* 40 CFR § 70.6(a)(3)(iii)(A) requires that permit require "reports of any required monitoring at least every 6 months." *Id.* King Finishing's permit does not contain any such requirement. *See* Ex. 9.

EPD claims that condition 5.3.1 of the permit satisfies the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) and 40 CFR § 70.6(a)(3)(iii)(A). Ex. 1 at Response to Comment 3. However, condition 5.3.1 requires reporting of excess emissions, exceedances and/or excursions. Ex. 9 at 11, Condition 5.3.1. The reporting of these deviations is required by § 70.6(a)(iii)(**B**). However, § 70.6(a)(iii)(**A**) requires reporting of all monitoring. It is a cardinal rule of statutory and regulatory interpretation that a regulation should be interpreted in such a manner as to not render any provision of the regulation meaningless. However, EPD's claim

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This issue was raised in Petitioner's Comment 3 at page 4-5, attached as Exhibit 3. Therefore, Petitioner has satisfied the requirement of 40 CFR § 70.8(d) that the petition points were raised with reasonable specificity during the public comment period.

that reporting of deviations constitutes reporting of any required monitoring renders § 70.6(a)(iii)(A) meaningless as it would be redundant to § 70.6(a)(iii)(B).

It is true that Condition 6.1.4.b does require bi-annual reporting of total process operating time during each reporting period. Ex. 1 at 8. The Clean Air Act and Part 70 require reporting of *all* monitoring. For example, Condition 5.3.2.b requires daily recording of the average hourly nitrogen oxides emission rates for Boiler B002. This is exactly the type of monitoring that § 70.6(a)(iii)(A) requires to be reported at least bi-annually and that King Finishing's permit does not require.

There is a related issue that will arise if US EPA requires EPD to include a requirement of providing monitoring information. Therefore, it is the best use of resources to address this issue now rather than have Petitioner once again appeal this permit. EPD appears to take the position in its narrative that even if it did include a requirement to provide monitoring information, § 70.6(a)(iii)(A) only requires a report of the monitoring information rather than submission of the actual monitoring information. While this may be a fair interpretation of the regulation, Petitioner is not sure that there is any difference between a report on the monitoring information and the actual monitoring information. It would seem that it would be the least onerous requirement on the permittee to have it simply photocopy the monitoring information, such as the log books, rather than having to convert the information into some unspecified report format. In conclusion, EPA should object to the permit and require EPD to include a permit provision that requires "submittal of reports of any required monitoring at least every 6 months." 40 CFR § 70.6(a)(3)(iii)(A).

#### 5. THE PERMIT DOES NOT CONTAIN ADEQUATE MONITORING

## FOR NOx EMISSIONS.<sup>10</sup>

40 CFR 70.6(a)(3)(A) requires that Title V permits contain "all monitoring

and analysis procedures or test methods required under applicable monitoring and testing requirements[.]" 40 CFR 60 Subpart Db is an applicable requirement to Boiler B002. Citing

40 CFR 60.49b(g), the permit requires the permittee to record the average hourly nitrogen

oxides emission rate either by measuring the emission rates or predicting the emission rates.

Ex. 9 at 11, Condition 5.3.2.b. Sierra Club commented that the permittee should not be

allowed to predict the NOx emission rates. Ex. 3 at 8. EPD responded the "Predictive

Emission Monitoring Systems (PEMS) is allowed under 40 CFR 60.48(g)(2) [sic] and is

considered monitoring." Ex. 1 at Response to comment 1. It appears that EPD meant to

reference 40 CFR 60.48b(g)(2). That subsection provides:

(g) The owner or operator of an affected facility that has a heat input capacity of 73 MW (250 million Btu/hour) or less, and which has an annual capacity factor for residual oil having a nitrogen content of 0.30 weight percent or less, natural gas, distillate oil, or any mixture of these fuels, greater than 10 percent (0.10) shall:

(1) Comply with the provisions of paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), and (f) of this section, or

(2) Monitor steam generating unit operating conditions and predict nitrogen oxides emission rates as specified in a plan submitted pursuant to § 60.49b(c).

40 CFR 60.48b(g). The Narrative and the Permit do not explain whether Boiler B002 has an annual capacity factor greater than 10 percent. Assuming that the Facility meets this requirement, this subsection still only allows predictions of NOx emission rates pursuant to a plan submitted pursuant to 40 CFR § 60.49b(c). This plan requires the permittee to specify

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> This issue was raised in Petitioner's Comment 10 at page 8, attached as Exhibit 3. Therefore, Petitioner has satisfied the requirement of 40 CFR § 70.8(d) that the petition points were raised with reasonable specificity during the public comment period.

the operating parameters to be monitoring and their relationship to the NOx emission rate. 40 CFR § 60.49b(c). The permittee must establish this relationship based on data. 40 CFR § 60.49b(c)(2). As the permittee does not require the submission of such a plan, the permit cannot allow the Facility to rely on predictions of NOx emission rates. Therefore, US EPA should object to this permit and change Condition 5.3.2.b to only allow NOx emission rates to be measured rather than predicted.

## VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, pursuant to 40 CFR § 70.8(d) the US EPA should object to this permit and modify it as explained above.

Respectfully Submitted,

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Dated: October 4, 2001

CC: Sierra Club Acting Regional Administrator, Region 4